Multisig signing, coordinated across people, devices, and organizations — and we never touch a key.
Mainnet is not open yet. SigVault is young software that will handle real money. We publish our threat model, our trust boundaries, and our limitations — read them before you deposit.
The split is the whole security argument: the thing on the internet holds no keys, and the thing holding the keys never talks to us.
Policy, ceremony state, and a signed audit trail. It sees PSBTs and policy. It never sees a key.
The open-source desktop app talks to your hardware wallet. Every transaction is confirmed on the device's own screen.
Choose a quorum — 2-of-3, 3-of-5, or a Taproot policy with time-locked recovery paths. Signers can come from inside your organization or from a counterparty's. Nobody has to join anyone else's workspace.
Each signer runs the open-source desktop app with their own hardware wallet. Keys are generated on the device and never leave it. SigVault never sees key material.
A session opens. Each signer reviews the transaction on their own device screen and approves. Partial signatures relay through the coordinator. When the threshold is met, the transaction broadcasts.
Each organization gets its own signed, exportable audit trail. Nothing is commingled.
In Bitcoin custody, a claim you can't prove costs more than a feature you don't have. Every line below links to the evidence.
Most custody products assume one account holder. SigVault assumes several parties who each need their own workspace, their own roles, and their own records — and who still need to sign together. A buyer, a seller, and an arbiter. Four founders. Five DAO delegates from five organizations.
See how organizations workSignatures are produced on hardware wallets. SigVault relays PSBTs, policy, and ceremony state — never private keys. A complete shutdown of SigVault would not put a single satoshi at risk, and our threat model spells out exactly why.
Read the threat modelPair your own instance of the wallet service and bind your vaults and devices to it. Your traffic goes through your hardware, on your network, behind your IP allow-list. Most people won't. The ones who do validate the architecture for everyone else.
Self-hosting guideVaults are built on output descriptors, BIP-388, and Miniscript. Your funds are recoverable in Sparrow or any descriptor-capable wallet without SigVault's cooperation or existence. Time-locked recovery paths execute on the Bitcoin network whether or not this company is still here.
How recovery worksCasa and Unchained both hold a key, and it hasn't hurt them, because they say so. The sin is never holding a key. It's claiming you don't.
Set your quorum so that our key is never decisive. If you run 2-of-3 with one SigVault key, we plus one compromised signer could move funds. That is a real consideration and you should design around it. We'd rather say so. That's the whole story.
Here's the threat modelOrganizations let teams, families, and institutions hold a vault together — and keys can come from members of different organizations, without merging anyone's workspace or audit trail.
Sharing a device gives an org visibility into a public key — not authority to spend. Every layer is revocable in one click.
join the org · grants role + grants
Accept an invite to become a member with a defined role and a per-permission grant set.
Opt in to expose a hardware device's public key to the org's vault builder. Revocable anytime.
Explicitly consent to your key joining each specific multisig. Per-vault, never blanket.
SigVault never holds keys, signs on a member's behalf, or auto-includes a device in a vault. The org is a coordination layer, not a custodian.
A quorum doesn't require everyone to agree on a vendor. Each signer uses whatever they already own — which matters when the keys belong to four people at three companies.
Always verify on the device screen, never in a browser. Bybit lost $1.46 billion because approvers trusted an interface instead of their hardware. That applies with us and with anyone else.
Five incidents from the last eighteen months. Not one of them was a cryptographic failure.
The signing interface lied to the people approving the transaction. The multisig math was correct.
Insider access at a support contractor turned a customer database into a target list.
The founder disappeared holding the only keys. The coins are still stranded.
Hot-wallet operations ran out of funds to honour withdrawals. Not cryptography — bookkeeping.
A self-custodial vendor shut down after an exploit and took its users' access with it.
Every one of them happened in the layer around the keys — the interface, the operator, the humans, the company's continued existence. That layer is where the money actually goes missing, and it is almost never the part anyone audits.
SigVault is that layer. So we built it to be checked rather than trusted.
This audience checks, and getting caught is unrecoverable. So here is only what exists — and plainly, what doesn't yet.
The desktop signer is BSD-3 licensed. Read the code that touches your keys.
Read it on GitHubWhat our servers can see, what an attacker who owned them could do, and what we don't protect against.
Read the threat modelVerify that the binary you're running matches the published source, byte for byte.
we'll link it here when it's realNo third-party audit has been completed. One is being scoped. When it lands we publish the full report — findings included, not a summary.
we'll link it here when it's realWe have not had a security incident. We have also not yet had enough users or enough time for that to mean very much, and we'd rather say so than imply a track record we haven't earned.